This week, seventy years ago, the Kingdom of Italy joined the German Reich in the European War, which, in turn brought war to the Mediterranean and the African continent.
    On May 22, 1939, the two Countries had executed the “Pact of Steel,” which guaranteed mutual support in the event of war. However, when war came, only Slovakia joined Germany in the invasion of Poland. Italy did not honor its commitment in the Pact of Steel and join the original “Coalition of the Willing” in its war.  This was not the first time that Italy had failed to honor a similar commitment to Germany.
    Prior to World War I, the Kingdom of Italy had executed a treaty of alliance with the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. However, when war came, the Italians, thinking the spoils would be greater with the Allies, reneged on their word, and in April 1915, joined the Allies and attacked Austria-Hungary. The immediate effects of this were threefold: (1) Great Britain and France were only fighting one enemy - Germany -  on one front; (2) Austria-Hungary was fighting three enemies - Russia, Serbia and Italy - on three fronts instead of two enemies on two fronts; (3) The Adriatic Sea, and therefore the Mediterranean, was closed to the Royal and Imperial Navy of Austria-Hungary and its submarines. The ultimate effect of Italian perfidy was that, after almost four years of death and destruction, the Allies won the war and imposed onerous terms on the defeated countries, which sowed the seeds for the next World War. On the other hand, if Italy had honored its commitment, the war probably would have ended much sooner with a victory for the Central Powers, with much less death and destruction and some territorial and colonial readjustments.
    In March 1940 the Italian Duce and the German Führer met at the train station at the Brenner Pass. At that meeting, Il Duce agreed to bring the Kingdom of Italy into the war, “...at an opportune moment.”  On May 16, 1940, British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, urged Mussolini not to involve Italy in the war. Two weeks later Mussolini told Hitler that Italy would enter the war. Of course, by then, Italian assistance was not needed for the defeat of France.
    On May 31, and again on June 2, Air Marshal Italo Balbo met with Il Duce, in an attempt to dissuade him from making a mistake. But, by now, all Mussolini could see was the Allies on the run and a German victory. He had already promised Hitler that Italy would come into the War. After these meetings with Mussolini, Balbo observed that, “The old man has gone crazy. I brought up the military cadres, materials that I need, and he tells me that he cannot delay his appointment with history!” Marshal Balbo wasn’t the only one to think that the Italian entry into the war was crazy. General Franco Lo Sardo (Ret. Caribinieri) was a 23-year-old lieutenant in the Italian field artillery who was married two days before his country’s entry into the war. He, too, thought that it was crazy. Lt. Lo Sardo later served in North Africa with the elite Ariete Armored Division.
    On June 10, 1940, the Kingdom of Italy declared war on Great Britain and France, effective the 11th of June 1940.  When he learned of Italy’s Declaration of War, U. S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “On this 10th day of June 1940 the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor.” French Premier Paul Reynaud commented to American Ambassador William Bullitt, “What really distinguished, noble, and admirable people the Italians are to stab us in the back at this moment!” For it was at that moment that the French abandoned Paris. Interestingly, neither the President nor the Premier had made a similar pronouncement when, nine months previously, the Soviet Union had committed a similar act when it occupied/invaded its fellow Slavic neighbor, Poland, while it was fighting the German Wehrmacht for its life. At least Italy had issued a Declaration of War!
    Army Group West, under the command of General Umberto Di Savoia, Crown Prince of Italy, containing seven hundred thousand Italian soldiers divided into the First Army under the command of General Pietro Pintor, and the Fourth Army under the command of General Alfredo Guzzoni, prepared to drive Italy’s little dagger into France. General Pintor would be killed in an airplane crash, later in the year, while serving as head of the Italian Armistice Commission. General Guzzoni went with Mussolini after he was rescued by the Germans in 1943, and commanded Army Group Liguria.
    Facing the Italian Army Group West was the French L’Armée des Alpes commanded by General René-Henri Olry with thirty-five thousand soldiers divided into three infantry divisions, manning the impregnable Maginot Line, or Alpine Line as it was called in this area. Unlike the German Wehrmacht, the Regio Esercito Italia did not have the luxury of bypassing the impregnable Maginot Line by invading neutral countries.
    On June 11, 1940, planes of the Regia Aeronautica attacked the British colony of Malta. Ten of its triple-engine Cant bombers attacked Grand Harbor, Hal Far and Kalafrana. It would prove to be a very modest beginning to what became known as the “Siege of Malta,” for which King George VI would award the island the George Cross for its gallantry.
    On June 12, the Italian submarine Bagnolini torpedoed and sank the British light cruiser Calypso south of Crete.
    The next day the Italian destroyer Strale sank the British submarine Odin in the Gulf of Taranto.
    On June 14th the French Navy shelled the Italian Port of Genoa, and the British captured Forts Capuzzo and Maddalena on the Libya side of the Egyptian border. 
    The following day, Il Duce ordered Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Army Chief-of-Staff to attack in three days. He told the Marshal, “I only need a few thousand dead so that I can sit at the peace conference as a man who has fought!” The Marshal had told the Duce that it would take 25 days to prepare an offensive - a not unreasonable period. Marshal Badoglio knew that, even with that amount of time, his country was not prepared for a war. It was still trying to digest the cost of its participation in the Spanish Civil War.
    On June 16th the French sloop La Curieuse sank the Italian submarine Provana, while the British submarine Grampus was sunk by Italian torpedo boats Circe and Clio off Sicily.
    Early the next morning Marshal of France, Philippe Pétain asked for an armistice with the German government.   That evening, the Italian Duce, and his son-in-law, Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano traveled by train to meet with the German Führer, the next day, at the Führerhaus in Munich to discuss terms of the armistice. On the train, the Italian dictator told the Count that he would demand, “...the total occupation of French territory and the surrender of the French fleet.” 
    The Führer quickly dispossessed Il Duce of these fantasies, by telling him that he wanted to separate Great Britain and France and, “...secure, if possible, a French government functioning on French territory. This would be far preferable to a situation in which the French might reject the German proposals and flee abroad to London to continue the war from there.”  This had already occurred with Poland, Norway, Belgium and The Netherlands. But it was more serious with France, because of: (1) its navy, the fourth largest in the world; and (2) its colonies all over the world.
    Count Ciano recounted in his diary that, “Mussolini is very much embarrassed. He feels that his role is secondary. In truth the Duce feels that the hour of peace is growing near and sees fading once again that unattainable dream of his life - glory on the field of battle.”
    Not to be outdone in the art of backstabbing and land grabbing, the Spanish Caudillo sent a memorandum to Berlin outlining Spain’s demands for entering the war, should Great Britain not go the way of France, “...after a short period of time preparing the public.”  El Generalíssimo Franco’s demands for Spanish “assistance?” Only French Morocco, Western Algeria, part of the Sahara and French West African colonies!
    The day after the conference between the two dictators in Munich, the Germans notified the French government that they were prepared to discuss an armistice and “suggested” that the French seek one from the Italians as well. The French were told that an armistice with Italy was a condition of any armistice with the Reich. The French were advised to contact the Italians through the Spanish, not the Vatican.
    The British submarine Orpheus was sunk by the Italian destroyer Turbine north of Tobruk, on the Libyan coast on June 19th.
    Notwithstanding all signs that the French were seeking an end to the fighting, the Italians proceeded with their “invasion” on June 20. They attacked in two directions. One attempted to cross the Alps and another proceeded along the Mediterranean Coast toward Nice. Of course, some of the French Units had been withdrawn to confront the Germans and some French Mountain Units had been sent to Norway. However, the French were still ensconced in the impregnable Alpine, or “Little Maginot,” Line, fortifications which guarded both approaches, and had destroyed most of the cross-frontier bridges and tunnels and blocked most of the Alpine passes. The Italian offensive stalled before the French Alpine Line. Its attack through the Little St. Bernard Pass was stopped by a massive snow storm and the fact that the Italian soldiers were unprepared and ill equipped to withstand the cold.  
    Those soldiers advancing along the Mediterranean Coast were stopped after five miles. Eventually soldiers of the Cosseria Infantry Division captured the Town of Menton on the Mediterranean, which today has a population of about thirty thousand. It was the largest population center which was captured by the Italians in this theater. 
    Under the circumstances - inadequate preparation, a well fortified and prepared enemy, harsh terrain and climate, inadequate equipment - more could not have been expected of the Italian soldiers. Italian casualties suffered during this campaign were 631 killed, 2,361 wounded, 2000 cases of frost bite and 616 missing. French losses were 40 killed, 84 wounded and 150 missing.
    On June 21st the French Battleship Lorraine shelled the Port of Bardia in the Italian colony of Libya. French aircraft also attacked the Italian ports of Taranto and Livorno. 
    On June 22, 1940, the French executed the armistice with Germany which provided that it was not effective until an armistice was executed with Italy. At the signing ceremony, the head of the French delegation, General Charles Huntziger complained to German General Wilhelm Keitel, “Although Italy has declared war on France, she has not waged war. France, in fact, does not have to ask Italy for an armistice because the armistice has actually existed since the day of the declaration of war!”
    The same day, the Italian Duce sent the German Führer a message significantly scaling back Italian demands - to, “...a demilitarized zone of 50 kilometers.”
    German planes transported the French delegation to Rome on June 23 and at 6:35 P.M. the next day, France and Italy concluded an armistice, which provided that it would become effective at 12:35 A.M. the next morning. That same day, General Archibald Wavell, commander of British forces in Egypt, Sudan and British Somalia, authorized the creation of the Long Range Desert Group - LRDG.  This small unit would cause the Axis many problems with their behind the lines raids and intelligence gathering. LRDG’s exploits inspired the TV series, “The Rat Patrol.”
    As would soon become apparent, (if it wasn’t already) the Royal Italian Army was woefully unprepared for a modern war. The Regia Marina, however was a different story. It was tasked with contesting the Royal Navy’s suzereignity in the Mediterranean, and when the final tally is examined, it gave as good as it got.
    As a result of the Italian declaration of war, the Italian Duce had tied his fate, and that of his country, to the fanaticism of Adolf Hitler. Most had expected that, after France fell, that Great Britain would throw in the towel as well. When that didn’t happen, the Italians were left to carry the fight to the British, on land in North and East Africa, and at sea in the Mediterranean. It was in North Africa that the Italian deficiencies, especially in armor and transport, would soon become apparent.

Mr. Wimbrow writes from Ocean City, Maryland, where he practices law representing those persons accused of criminal and traffic offenses, and those persons who have suffered a personal injury through no fault of their own.